Time, Determinism & Free Will
The Consequence Argument
A tightly formal argument for incompatibilism: if determinism is true, our present acts are the necessary consequence of the distant past plus the laws of nature — neither of which is ‘up to us’ — so our present acts are not ‘up to us’ either, however things feel from the inside.
Proponents
Peter van Inwagen
Evidence For
Widely regarded as the most rigorous and influential formal case for incompatibilism, precisely stating an intuition — that we don't control the past or the laws — that most people accept immediately.
Evidence Against
Philosopher David Lewis's influential 1981 reply argues the argument trades on an ambiguity in what it means to be 'able to break a law of nature,' and that on the more defensible reading of that phrase, compatibilism survives intact.
Real Sources
Transmissions
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