Death & What Follows

Epicurean Materialism (The Termination Thesis)

alternative Classical 3rd century BCE (Epicurus); modern "termination thesis" term from philosopher Fred Feldman, 1992

Holds that death is the permanent end of the person and of all experience — and, distinctively, argues this means death cannot actually harm the person who dies, since harm requires an experiencing subject and death leaves no subject behind to be harmed.

Proponents

Epicurus, Lucretius, Fred Feldman

Evidence For

A tightly logical argument: if you don't exist, nothing can be bad for you; you don't exist after death; therefore death isn't bad for you — a conclusion Epicurus's follower Lucretius reinforced by pointing out nobody mourns the eons of non-existence before their own birth.

Evidence Against

Most people retain a strong intuition that death IS a genuine harm — a "deprivation" of the good life a person otherwise would have had — even without a subject around afterward to feel deprived, a response philosophers call the deprivation account, still debated as either rescuing or merely restating the original puzzle.

Transmissions

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